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Time and the migrant Other: European border controls and the temporal economics of illegality
The rich world's borders increasingly seem like a battleground where a new kind of 'threat' is fought back -the so-called 'illegal migrant'. At Europe's southern frontiers, sea patrols, advanced surveillance machinery and fencing keep migrants out, much like at the US, Israeli or Australian borders. Such investments have created a dense web of controls that displaces the border both inward and outwards, into the borderlands beyond it. This article, building upon recent border studies and ethnographies of illegality, explores Europe's migration controls by focusing on their temporal aspects. In the borderlands, it shows, irregular migrants are not only subjected to extended periods of waiting, as migrants often are; they also face an active usurpation of time by state authorities through serial expulsions and retentions.
The ways in which migrants' time is appropriated reveal a complex economics of illegality, complementing existing 'biopolitical' perspectives on Europe's borders.
In the sweltering days of August 2010, I was visiting the police headquarters in Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave on the African side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Behind a cluttered desk sat the chief of Ceuta's police migration bureau, who had a big problem on his hands. One block away, irregular sub-Saharan migrants stuck in the enclave had staged a loud protest, clamouring for 'freedom'. Housed in a 'temporary reception center' (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes, or CETI) at the very edge of Ceuta, the migrants had marched on the central square, where they congregated in front of the Spanish government delegation. Facing riot police, they chanted a mix of Africa, liberté and Shakira's waka waka -this was the time of the soccer World Cup. Most of them were dressed in the CETI's handout jogging dress, their T-shirts torn and twisted into turbans or scribbled upon as makeshift placards.
'CETI is a prison' read one. 'CETI Guantánamo Libertad' said another. This is what their increasingly desperate protest was about: migrants' indefinite retention in Ceuta at the behest of Spanish police and European politicians.
The police chief leafed through his files and muttered a reply as I asked about any impending crackdown. 'What they're doing is perfectly legal, anyone has the right to demonstrate,' he said. As he saw it, they simply had to wait for their turn before being sent on to la península, or the Spanish mainland. 'In the meantime they will stay here, free, with the same freedom as you and I have to move around a territory of 19 square kilometers.' But as I asked him about a recent drop in irregular migrants entering the enclave -either over its perimeter fences, smuggled in cars, or in inflatable dinghies -the police chief swiftly qualified his notion of freedom.
'Ceuta, of course, is in plain language... almost a mousetrap [ratonera] , migrants who arrive don't know whether they will leave in 15 days [or whether] they will spend two years here, and I don't think that's in their interest.'
The protesters' rendering of the 'temporary' reception centre as Guantánamo and the police chief's description of Ceuta as a 'trap' highlight in stark fashion the central theme of this article -that is, the rising stakes over migrants' time at Europe's borders. Increasingly, irregular migrants trying to enter EU space -and Ceuta, like its sister enclave Melilla, is EU territory -are retained for long periods, whether in the facilities for migrant detention springing up across the continent or in the type of 'open' center pioneered in the enclaves. The time delay built into their migratory experience provides important insights into Western states' response to unauthorized human mobility, on display from the Arizona desert to Australian coasts and European shores. Temporality, it will be argued, has become a multifaceted tool and vehicle -even a weapon of sorts -in the 'fight against illegal migration'.
Of course, migrants have always been subjected to waiting and wasted time as they move across international borders. From 1892 onwards, European emigrants arriving in Ellis Island after weeks at sea endured waits for medical examinations while warehoused in bunks, hoping their relatives or 'sponsors' would show up and finally take them into United States proper.
1 Yet mobility in the pre-war years was nevertheless relatively smooth in comparison with recent decades. Ever since rich states put an end to their labor migration programs around the 1970s, controls have toughened to the point of impossibility, at least for certain kinds of travelers. Waiting, insecurity and eventual refusal have come to characterize border experiences for those without the economic, social and cultural capital needed to deploy 'flexible citizenship' in a world on the move (Ong 1999) .
This link between cross-border movement and waiting -or, as one review on migrant temporalities puts it, the 'strong relationship between power, the state and management of time' (Griffiths et al 2013:30 ) -has been noted in studies of contemporary migratory regimes. Pijpers (2011) , delineating the 'political economy of waiting' in European labor migration, has argued that 'the ensemble of border control practices finds expression in the metaphor of the queue' (2011:431; emphasis in original) . Yet some foreigners -asylum seekers or those scheduled for deportation, for instance -would wish for such a queue, stuck indefinitely as they often are in detention centers run by large private corporations. Ceuta's protest against 'Guantánamo' can thus be linked to a long historical genealogy and a broad contemporary field of temporal exclusion in international migration. Yet something more sinister was also going on at the Spanish-African border -that is, something more than a simple waste or negation of migrants' time. Pijpers (2011:432) The strategy, then, was to remove Ceuta and Melilla from the smuggling route by selectively retaining and deporting migrants. In this policing effort, the time migrants spent in the enclaves constituted capital withheld from the presumed smuggling rings.
However, the 'mafias' were not the real target of this strategy, since most sub-Saharan migrants -as the police chief was well aware -had arrived in Ceuta through their own efforts. For these migrants, retention constituted collective punishment, reducing them to indefinite confinement in Ceuta and Melilla.
To understand the predicament of the migrants as well as the logics behind their confinement, this article will drawn on two interrelated fields: interdisciplinary studies of border controls, and recent ethnographies of irregular migration. As a consequence, it will move back-and-forth between the temporalities of control and of migration -that is, state time and subjective time -in order to highlight their intricate entanglements. Based on 'mobile' fieldwork across the Spanish-African border over 14 months in 2010-11, the article will use three scenarios to build a picture of the border's complex 'geography of time' (Glennie and Thrift 1996:280) , moving from the EU's top-down surveillance vision to the migratory journey and, onwards, to the battle over time in the Spanish enclaves. (2008) and Agamben (1998; see e.g. Fassin 2001 ). This article, however, goes down a slightly different route in adding an economic element to such existing studies. The appropriation and usage of migrants' time, it will be seen, plays into a larger economics of illegality, generating unequal gains and distressing human consequences at the rich world's borders. An interdisciplinary literature on this fortification has emerged in recent years, often focusing precisely on the spatial arrangements of the EU border. In a recent review, Sarah Green (2013:350) has identified a 'spatial turn' in European border research, evident in the field of migration in concerns with mapping the continent's 6 'borderscapes' (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007) , with delineating the proliferation of spaces of control (Balibar 1998) , or with tracking the border's 'deterritorialization'
and 'reterritorialization' (Walters 2004) . Summing up these trends, one contribution notes that critical border studies, 'rather than treating the concept of the border as a territorially fixed, static, line (as paradigmatically depicted by Mercator's map)', are increasingly 'thinking of it in terms of a series of practices' (Parker et al 2009:586) .
This focus on the 'process of bounding ' (Wastl-Walter 2011:2) is not news to anthropologists, who have long looked at forms of 'frontier praxis' around Europe's borders, to borrow a term from Driessen's (1992) seminal work in Melilla. Yet when it comes to the interdisciplinary debates on migration controls, an increasingly dominant task for border forces, one aspect of 'frontier praxis' is often left relatively unaddressed -the temporality of such controls (Griffiths et al 2013; Khosravi 2014) .
In anthropology, such temporal aspects have been tentatively explored, for instance, in works considering the time lags built into US border patrolling (Heyman 1995) , the 'temporality of everyday risk' among migrants (Willen 2007:22) , and experiences of waiting among asylum seekers and immigration detainees (Griffiths 2014; Rotter 2010) . Inspired by such studies, this section will focus on the temporalities of border control measures, as well as their entanglement with notions of anticipation, preemption and risk.
In Ceuta, the Spanish Guardia Civil -in charge of patrolling the fencesomewhat surprisingly saw the imposing, EU-funded barrier as a mere 'obstacle'. To one officer, 'the fence has the function of giving us a few minutes extra in arriving at the place [of attempted crossing], it does not dissuade.' Those few extra minutes were of utmost importance for the sentinels at the EU's southernmost borders. In Ceuta's sister enclave Melilla, beset by desperate entry attempts by sub-Saharan migrants hiding in the Moroccan hills, the official aim was for a patrol car to arrive within a minute of a sensor detection at the fence. Such rapid detection and deployment was key for a simple, unstated reason: to enable removal from the border. If apprehended around the fences, migrants were simply sent back informally -and extralegallyinto the hands of Moroccan forces. The Moroccans in turn expelled migrants to the closed Algerian border, from where they often made it back to the enclaves by foot over several days. 6 In this way, their entry attempts had temporarily been averted.
To explore Europe's border controls, several studies have in recent years drawn on Virilio's (1986) notion of 'dromology', or the logic of speed (see e.g. Bigo and Guild 2005:1). For Virilio, the quest for speed is intimately linked to militarization and the reorganization of territory (Armitage 1999:6) -something that was was amply illustrated in the border technology rolled out not just in Ceuta, but along the whole external EU border. While the Ceuta fence illustrated the most extreme 'militarized' logic of speed -a few extra seconds for the guards at the fence, culminating in long days on the road for expelled migrants -more abstract temporal features were on display elsewhere in Europe's border control landscape.
Besides the fortified fences, Spain has been at the vanguard of sea surveillance since the installation of an advanced coastal radar system from the late 1990s
onwards. This 'life-saving' system, known as SIVE ( In Warsaw, in short, the quest for time-space compression motivated the large investments in new information-sharing systems for the EU frontiers. Real-time intelligence, or as close to it as possible, was of the essence.
This logic is taken to its furthest yet in the 'European external border surveillance system', or Eurosur, an advanced information-sharing system between Frontex and national security forces. The aim of Eurosur is, again, to enhance 'reaction capability' through a smooth process that converts the border into a species of information channel communicating up, sideways and down in a chain of signals.
As one commentator on Eurosur puts it:
[C]ontemporary border control practices do away with the perpetual present of vigilance on the border-line and the excruciatingly slow passing of time. The key ethical premise, here, is speed, and the possibility of projecting controls as quickly as possible at any given point that is 8 considered problematic. Spatiality and temporality, in this perspective, are not only problematized in terms of 'where' and 'when', but also in terms of 'how fast?' (Jeandesboz 2011:123) .
This quest for speed is intimately tied up with the concept of risk. I have discussed elsewhere how risk analysis, promoted by Frontex, has not only channelled the energies of border forces into the task of controlling migration -it has also facilitated the growth of an 'illegality industry' around the distribution of migratory risk (Andersson 2014) . Here, however, it is worth dwelling briefly on the temporal modalities -rather than the distributive possibilities -of risk. As scholars such as Anthony Giddens have noted, risk is 'a central tool in the modern endeavor of "colonising the future"' (Selchow 2014:69) , which involves seeing 'the future [as] a "territory" to be "occupied"' (Giddens 1999:5) . Applying this to Europe's migration controls, the seas are not only physically occupied by patrols, but they are also colonized in a temporal sense thanks to pre-emptive, risk-based action. The key task of speedy intervention is to prevent unauthorized movement before a migrant has crossed the border. In Eurosur, then, the few extra seconds that allow the Guardia Civil's patrol cars to reach the fences in time to 'repel' the migrants has been replaced with a much more abstract usage of time, reaching into the 'prefrontier' beyond the border in order to cut short any intention to cross.
Noting these developments, Mountz and Hiemstra (2012:467) see borders as increasingly mobile in 'enclosing' migrant vessels or bodies in anticipation of a transgression. However, the effect of early interception, as seen at Ceuta's fences, is simply the deceleration of migratory movements, as Andrijasevic (2010) has also noted at the Italian entry port of Lampedusa. Border workers themselves are aware of these dynamics, and for that reason frequently present their task as one of channelling or slowing down the 'flow' rather than blocking it altogether. One Spanish police officer, for instance, insisted that 'you have to leave an escape route' so as not to create a 'pressure cooker' at the border. As a consequence of such strategies, migrants are speedily diverted, deported or left stranded, only to eventually make it back again through the rugged terrains of the 'prefrontier', more desperate and destitute than ever.
Looking briefly beyond the European borders, this scenario should sound familiar to American audiences -and for good reason. There is a constant give-and-take between militarized controls on both sides of the Atlantic, with European states often adopting U.S. border innovations. However, geographical and geopolitical constraints also lead to important differences (Andreas and Snyder 2000) . In the States, a land border shared with a single neighboring country allows for faster interception and removal, yet also means that many more migrants make it across. By contrast, Europe's maritime southern borders, shared by a multiplicity of E.U. and neighboring states, complicate the tasks of joint detection and interception, yet also allows for a more effective 'buffering' of migrants on the other shore of the Mediterranean.
The intricate interactions between geography and temporality in migration controls create what I wish to call, building on Glennie and Thrift (1996) , a peculiar landscape of time. In the European case, this landscape has a paradoxical quality, as seen at the fences: it is both the product of ever higher speeds and connectivity, yet also creates a migratory experience characterized by slowness and stasis. were but a small pointer toward the shared notion of movement among migrants and police: the borderlands construed as a smooth space, quickly traversable from A to B.
To both the border workers and the migrants they targeted, speed was of the essence, yet in quite different ways.
Alpha's journey recalls the state of 'being en route' explored by Coutin (2005) on the other side of the Atlantic. Illegality, Coutin suggests, 'erases presence and suspends time ' (2005:196) . As noted in the introduction, marginalized groups often find themselves caught in what Crapanzano (1985) has labeled the 'paralytic' time of waiting.
Khosravi (2014) , expanding on this, writes, 'The ambiguity about the duration of waiting generates a sense of uncertainty, shame, depression and anxiety... But waiting can be an act too, a strategy of defiance by the migrants.'
There is, then, a doubleness to waiting. On the one hand, it constitutes an imposed state of 'stuckedness' (Hage 2009 ) engendered by pre-emptive controls, in which time may appear as 'sticky' or 'suspended' (Griffiths 2014 Lucht's Ghanaian migrants experienced this 'nontime' along the highways outside Naples, waiting for employers or buses that never came. In the depths of their despair, they nevertheless held onto a notion of 'darkness before daybreak', how the darkest hour came just before the impending dawn. Their 'non-time' could in this way be temporarily infused with meaning.
Beyond the European horizon, similar examples can easily be found. In a migrant shelter on the southern Mexican border, for example, I once met Central
American migrants who waited anxiously -often after having been robbed, like
Mali's refoulés, by bandits or border guards -for the chance to head back north 
The battle over time: Ceuta and Melilla
Up in Ceuta's hills lay the camp, as clandestine migrants called their 'home' in the enclave. Its residents, largely black Africans, were an exclusive crowd. Having finally breached the EU frontier, they thought fortune was smiling at them -yet here they would face a state of 'stuckedness' every bit as despairing as that of Bamako or their home countries. This was so because Spain's North African enclaves were gaps in the border's landscape of time; that is, liminal spaces with their own, warped temporal
logics. Yet in these gaps, the times of control and migration would also come to clash openly with each other.
The CETI, where I carried out fieldwork as a volunteer over the summer of 2010, was run under a mixed management system -the managers and social workers were civil servants while the Spanish Red Cross carried out most day-to-day work, besides NGOs and private contractors. 9 The camp was set out over two levels: office buildings upstairs, living quarters downstairs. Unlike in the foreigners' detention centers of the peninsula, the migrants who lived here could come and go before the gates closed at night. They slept in eight prefab modules of eight rooms each, eight dorm beds to a room: 512 beds in all, yet regularly pushed beyond capacity.
The camp was a magnet for the media. When access was granted it was a dream come true: here journalists had the possibility to come and interview illegal migrants fresh off their rafts. Documentary-makers, reporters and fact-finding delegations kept arriving at the camp gates; cameramen denied access resorted to filming the residents through the tall perimeter fence. For these visitors, the camp provided just enough of a glimpse of the veiled world of today's global outcasts.
Migrant camps such as the CETIs are not just key stages for the media spectacle of illegality; they have also become important sites for studying Europe's border regime, as this article itself is evidence of. Many of these studies take as their starting point Agamben's (1998) In this view, migrant camps serve as 'speed boxes' (Tsianos et al 2009:8) that regulate the flow of people according to the fickle needs of the European labor market. In Agier's (2011:47) typology of encampment, the CETIs would be similarly classed as 'sorting centers' where migrants are pushed through an elaborate process of 'flow management'. As 'sorting centers' or 'speed boxes', however, the CETIs had one particularity. In Ceuta, the 'flow' had by 2010 been reduced to near-zero. In 2005, the average stay had been three months; now it was one and a half years. From having been springboards, Ceuta and Melilla had become, in the words of police, activists and lawyers alike, ratoneras or trampas -traps.
As a result, a silent day-to-day battle was being waged over time withheld and stolen, emptied time, time bought and given, time retrieved for observation, scrutiny and care. This waste of time, in turn, was predicated upon migrants' spatial immobility. In Ceuta and Melilla, a regime of interlocking time-spaces, unevenly stretched over the enclaves' tiny territories, seemed to regulate migrants as a population while disciplining them as bodies in the biopolitical fashion delineated by Foucault (2008) -a point that will be returned to in the conclusion. In Ceuta, the camp layout helped create two distinct but complementary rhythms. Upstairs, 'time discipline' (Thompson 1967) reigned. Mealtimes at 1pm and 8pm, enforced by the guards; curfew at night, when everyone had to be in or else be registered as absent. In this regimented upstairs time, paperwork gave the impression of progress. New arrivals were admonished to keep their documents safely, including the protocolo slip listing the camp's compulsory meetings. A stamp marked attendance for each meeting over the residents' first week: medical screening, psychological test, a Spanish class introduction and a presentation on asylum.
The schedules held out the promise of accumulating 'good time' for those who played by the rules. This was most visible in the dossier held on each migrant that, workers insisted, might help them eventually reach the peninsula. This upstairs time regime was a fragile construct, however. Frontline workers complained about the arbitrariness of sanctions and the randomness of appointments, with residents made to 18 wait for long times before seeing a state official. The protocolo slips sometimes stayed unstamped for weeks.
If paperwork, clockwork and compulsory meetings at least created a distinct upstairs temporality, time downstairs sagged and melted like a surrealist clock. The sleeping modules were alternately hot and freezing, with mold stains across the bare walls adding to the atmosphere of neglect. Here, in the fleeting, endless present of downstairs time -reminiscent of the 'pragmatics of time' found by Desjarlais (1994) in shelters or the 'heavy' time encountered by Goffman (1961) in mental asylumshope took on a phantasmatic quality. Much like the phony promises of upstairs time, migrants harbored rosy thoughts of the future once they made it 'up' (en haut) to the peninsula: they would find work, call friends, move on. Their adventures would then finally have been worth the long, painful wait for deliverance.
In Ceuta, the migratory time-space regime stretched from the minuscule pauses in migrants' speech through the schedules of the camp system and onto the abstract In Ceuta, the resulting predicament has echoes with temporalities elsewhere in the contemporary world. Guyer (2007) has suggested a temporal shift towards a longterm time horizon and the 'evacuation of the near-present' in US society. For Ceuta's migrants, their immediate future had rather been vacated for them while their past had been temporarily disowned. Like for Guyer's evangelical informants, the far-ahead future of deliverance instead became all the more real; their fate was down to the 'grace of God' they constantly invoked.
At the same time, migrants used waiting to their own advantage, as a conscious technique to stall deportation. They also short-circuited the official usage of migratory time-space, as was seen in the 2010 protest. As the din grew ever more raucous on Ceuta's streets, journalists alleged that the protesters had in fact not been stranded in Ceuta for long. This might have been true, yet missed the main pointthat is, how migrants tried to take back their colonized future, rather than recuperate a lost past. They did so by challenging the discrete time-spaces afforded migrants in the enclave's landscape of time. By rejecting their containment on a faraway hillside and marching on the city center, the protesters challenged the time-space regime by which they were rendered as separable, pitiable and researchable. Their protest would eventually fail: 'instigators' were detained, some of them deported. Yet in a trickle, migrants eventually made it out of Ceuta, through luck, cunning or to ease the burden on the camp. The battle over time remained, for both sides, unwinnable. Besides the politics of captivity, a temporal perspective may also highlight another key feature of contemporary controls: an intricate economics of illegality at play in the 'fight against illegal migration'.
Conclusion: the temporal economics of illegality
On a financial level, the quest for time-space compression and for anticipating migratory risk has spurred technological innovations and new policing mechanisms, bringing more resources to defense companies and border agencies. The time delays of encampment, meanwhile, also produce significant economics benefits. In the States, the vast, privately run migrant detention estate is proving a lifeline for deprived communities (Barry 2011) ; in Italy, reception centers are run by large consortiums under often shady financial arrangements (Cosentino 2014) ; and in Australia, offshore detention is doubly outsourced to poor neighboring states and to private contractors (Mountz 2011) . In Ceuta, migrants themselves were the first to notice the economic gains of encampment, in labeling (as some did) migration a 'business' and their protest a 'strike'.
Yet while such financial aspects are important, 'colonizing the future' can also be its own reward, as was seen in Ceuta. The 'time capital' held by migrants -rather than their labor power -was in Spain's crisis-hit summer of 2010 the most valuable asset that those stranded within the walls held in the eyes of their hosts.
It may be worth briefly unpacking the notion of time capital in relation to the specific sense of 'economics of illegality' proposed here. The point is not to downplay either the economic usefulness of irregular migration or the disciplining function of camps in preparing migrants for the lowest rungs of the labor market.
Rather, the aim is to highlight the discrete logics of exchange, consumption and production being developed within the smaller, yet increasingly important circuit of what I call the 'illegality industry' engaged in migration controls (Andersson 2014) - and how these logics at times clash with larger labor needs, as in Ceuta in 2010. Seen as a form of capital, migrant time was here withheld for a deferred future gain -that is, for purposes of deterrence, whether to discourage more arrivals or to produce a chilling effect on asylum applications. This abstract 'capital' was however also constantly transferred across to the 'real economy' via the distribution of funds for camp management. Finally, time capital could also be 'cashed in' at given moments.
This occurred in the organization of deportation flights, in which indefinite retention allowed for round-ups yielding dozens of co-nationals at a time. It also occurred when European governments sought to use mass encampment in broadcasting an 'emergency' at the border, thus bolstering calls for more implication from Brussels.
A temporal take on the Euro-African borderlands of the kind proposed here, in sum, suggests other ways of thinking about migration controls than those offered by the biopolitical accounts alluded to earlier in this article. Walters (2011) has asserted that we may need to think beyond Foucault's (biopolitical) 'toolbox' to grasp contemporary controls, and the appropriation of migrants' time pushes exactly at this limit. Instead of intervening upon migrants' vital characteristics, as biopolitics does, controls of the kind seen in Ceuta extract vitality. Instead of subjectifying or subjugating bodies, border guards put them into uneven circulation. In this way, Europe's 'illegality industry' usurps (or consumes) migrants' mobility, and puts it to use for its own ends. It deposes or retains their bodies in a show of deterrence. It stretches their experience of time, either by keeping them stranded or by slowing them down through expulsion or removal from the border. This extractive processthis economics of illegality in the broadest sense -helps structure the peculiar temporalities experienced by clandestine migrants at the edges of Europe.
The industry, then, is also productive -throwing further light on the relation between this article's juxtaposed temporal frames, a coldly calculating 'time of control' on the one hand and a rugged 'time of migration' on the other. To the authorities, Ceuta was a trap; to migrants it was a pause. To the police, Bamako constituted a buffer, while to migrants it was akin to a swamp, dragging them down.
Returning to remarks above on time-space under globalization, the possibilities of anticipation, interception and deferral opened up by compression and speed have led to precisely the opposite reality for those who are targeted: a world of slowness and stasis. One mobile assemblage, that of control, feeds off and perpetuates the increasing immobility of its necessary Other.
However, it is worth complicating this picture. Migration controls are far from a unified field -rather, they are ad hoc creations developed in accordance with political and media priorities, the constraints of geography and geopolitics, and the supple tactics of migrants and smugglers. Moreover, their productivity is always in excess to the industry's needs. When the Melilla border fence was fortified in 2013, 22 new spectacular entry attempts picked up pace. And as retention grew longer in Ceuta, new techniques of waiting emerged, in a game of make-believe played out with increasingly frustrated officials.
If the control mechanisms in place from the Sahel to southern Spain can be approached as an economics of illegality, then, it is an economics beset by a fundamental circularity. For the fight against illegal migration does not just come with a steep price tag; it also creates what can be conceptualized as negative externalities, in the sense familiar from environmental economics. The controls might have been costed and evaluated, but their insidious social, political and human effects are rarely taken into consideration. And these 'side-effects' constantly threaten to overrun the workings of the illegality industry, whether in raucous protests such as those of Ceuta, in new techniques of waiting, or in ever-riskier entry attempts. Or to frame these dynamics through this article's temporal lens: the constant deferrals produced by border controls incur a 'debt' that will eventually have to be repaid at the frontiers of Europe.
Back in 2010, barely a month after the deportation of nine of Ceuta's protesters to Cameroon, some of them had already made it back to the enclave. As hardened migrants, they fast-tracked through the borderlands, despite the fences and radars and police blocking their path. Their return to the 'Guantánamo' they had protested against might seem inconceivable. Yet like with the protest itself, the logic of the return has to be found in the struggle over migrants' time -their captive present, their past on the road and their imagined future. There was simply no going back for the clandestine migrants of Ceuta.
